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Abstract
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) is a term used by NASA programs as an expansion 
of the general hazard reduction process where if an identified hazard cannot be 
eliminated, the design is modified to reduce the associated mishap risk to an acceptable 
level.   DFMR is a set of specific requirements to minimize risk.  DFMR is not well 
understood and there are many misconceptions concerning the meaning and use.  This 
paper will provide insight into the use of DFMR for space applications; it’s comparison to 
other hazard mitigation strategies and examples of how the approach has been used in 
the past.  It will also highlight documents used by NASA on various programs to 
determine DFMR.
Background
Since most projects/programs use failure tolerance as the primary and preferred 
approach to control hazards, it will be discussed first.  Failure tolerance is the concept of 
having redundant means to provide a function to protect against failure of one of the 
means.  A simple example is having matches to back up failure of a lighter for starting a 
fire.  A second lighter would work but may be prone to the same failure mode of the first 
lighter.  A more complex example might be a spacecraft with multiple batteries, each 
able to perform the function of providing power without the other battery. 
Failure tolerance increases the likelihood that a required function is available when 
needed by increasing reliability of the safety function through redundancy.  This does 
not alleviate the need for quality of the chosen components.  Three low quality or poorly 
designed redundant components do not assure function and may provide a sense of 
false security.   Another aspect of redundancy is common cause failures.  This leads to 
design with unlike redundancy.  In the previous example of matches and lighter, the 
lighter may not be as prone to moisture issues while the matches may be less of a long 
term storage issue. 
As the redundant item becomes more difficult to integrate, it may inject additional failure 
modes, complexity, or sometimes prevent the overall function of the system.  In the 
case of the batteries, diodes or fuses must protect the additional batteries from each 
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other so that failure of one does not propagate a failure to another.  This means diodes, 
fuses, and switches, all of which could fail, preventing the system from providing the 
required power.  The structure of a pressure vessel is a more obvious example.  Is it 
practical to provide two pressure vessels, one inside the other, to mitigate leakage or 
rupture? If there is a rupture of the inner vessel, the effectiveness of an outer vessel is 
very much in question.  The rupture of the inner vessel may very well contribute to a 
rupture of the outer vessel.  It may be more effective to reduce the stress in one vessel 
by thickening the wall.  How much thickening is sufficient and does thickening cause 
additional failure modes?  The mass of the system may also be prohibitive.  For 
example if a redundant battery system and its associated protection hardware becomes 
too heavy, it may prohibit the overall function of the space craft.  This is the beginning of 
the DFMR investigation. 
The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) for Human-Rating Space Systems 
(Reference 1) states this clearly “First and foremost, the failure tolerance is applied at 
the overall system level – to include all capabilities of the system. While failure 
tolerance is a term frequently used to describe minimum acceptable redundancy, it may 
also be used to describe two similar systems, dissimilar systems, cross-strapping, or 
functional interrelationships that ensure minimally acceptable system performance 
despite failures, or additional features that completely mitigate the effects of failures. 
Even when assessing failure tolerance at the integrated system level, the increased 
complexity and the additional utilization of system resources (e.g. mass, power) 
required by a failure tolerant design may negatively impact overall system safety as the 
level of failure tolerance is increased.
Ultimately, the level and type of redundancy (similar or dissimilar) is an important and 
often controversial aspect of system design. Since redundancy does not, by itself, 
make a system safe, it is the responsibility of the engineering and safety teams to 
determine the safest practical system design given the mission requirements and 
constraints. Additionally, the overall system reliability is a significant element of the 
integrated safety and design analysis used in the determination of the level of 
redundancy. Redundancy alone without sufficient reliability does not meet the intent of 
this requirement. 
When a critical system fails because of improper or unexpected performance due to 
unanticipated conditions, similar redundancy can be ineffective at preventing the 
complete loss of the system. Dissimilar redundancy is very effective provided there is 
sufficient separation among the redundant legs. (For example, dissimilar redundancy 
where the power for all redundant capability was routed through a common conduit 
would not survive a failure where the conduit was severed). It is also highly desirable 
that the spaceflight system performance degrades in a predictable fashion to allow 
sufficient time for failure detection and, when possible, system recovery even when 
experiencing multiple failures. 
There are examples of dissimilar redundancy in current systems. For Earth reentry, the 
Soyuz spacecraft has a dissimilar backup ballistic entry mode to protect for loss of the 
primary attitude control system and a backup parachute for landing. Other examples 
include backup batteries for critical systems that protect for loss of the primary electrical 
system and the use of pressure suits during reentry to protect for loss of cabin pressure. 
Ultimately, the program and Technical Authorities evaluate and agree on the failure 
scenarios/modes and determine the appropriate level of failure tolerance and the 
practicality of using dissimilar redundancy or backup systems to protect for common 
cause failures.”
Understanding DFMR
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) is more than increased margin; it is an approach that
relies on years of proven capability. DFMR relies on robust design, standard approach, 
and high quality to provide the increased likelihood the required function is available.  
These aspects require a well-understood desired function together with a fully 
developed quality system to be effective. Safety Design for Space Systems (Reference 
2) states, “ The selection of this approach is not simply an alternative to failure tolerance 
because of cost, schedule, or noncompliance with failure tolerance but rather a 
deliberate decision to select a proven design concept that has been demonstrated 
through experience the characteristic of eliminating or reducing credible failures.” 
The NPR for Human-Rating Space Systems (Reference 1) states, “Failure of primary 
structure, structural failure of pressure vessel walls, and failure of pressurized lines are 
excepted from the failure tolerance requirement provided the potentially catastrophic 
failures are controlled through a defined process in which approved standards and 
margins are implemented that account for the absence of failure tolerance.  Other 
potentially catastrophic hazards that cannot be controlled using failure tolerance are 
excepted from the failure tolerance requirements with concurrence from the Technical 
Authorities provided the hazards are controlled through a defined process in which 
approved standards and margins are implemented that account for the absence of 
failure tolerance.  Rationale: The overall objective is to provide the safest design that 
can accomplish the mission given the constraints imposed on the program. Since 
space system development will always have mass, volume, schedule, and cost 
constraints, choosing where and how to apply failure tolerance requires integrated 
analyses at the system level to assess safety and mission risks… 
Where failure tolerance is not the appropriate approach to control hazards, specific 
measures need to be employed to: (1) Recognize the importance of the hazards being 
controlled; (2) Ensure robustness of the design; and (3) Ensure adequate 
attention/focus is being applied to the design, manufacture, test, analysis, and 
inspection of the items. In the area of design, in addition to the application of 
specifically approved standards and specifications, these measures can include 
identification of specific design features which minimize the probability of occurrence of 
failure modes, such as application of stringent factors of safety or other design margins. 
For manufacture, these measures can include establishing special process controls and 
documentation, special handling, and highlighting the importance of the item for those 
involved in the manufacturing process. For test, this can include accelerated life testing, 
fleet leader testing program, testing to understand failure modes or other testing to 
establish additional confidence and margin in the design. For analysis (in lieu of tests), 
these measures can include correlation with testing representative of the actual 
configuration and the collection, management, and analysis of data used in trending 
failures, verifying loss of crew requirements, and evaluating flight anomalies. For 
inspection, these measures can include identification of specific inspection criteria to be 
applied to the item or the application of Government Mandatory Inspection Points for 
important characteristics of the item. This approach to hazard control takes advantage 
of existing standards or standards approved by the Technical Authorities to control 
hazards associated with the physical properties of the hardware and are typically 
controlled via application of margin to the environments experienced by the design or 
system properties effected by the environment. Acceptance of these approaches by the 
Technical Authorities avoids processing waivers for numerous hazard causes where 
failure tolerance is not the appropriate approach. This includes, but is not limited to, 
Electro-Magnetic Interference, Ionizing Radiation, Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris, 
structural failure, pressure vessel failure, and aerothermal shell shape for flight.”
In addition to the NPR for Human-Rating, NASA has a number standards which have 
been developed over many years considering failures and successes which define 
specific DFMR requirements.  These standards must be either met or exceeded.  
NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, 
provide the requirements to assure that the materials used are sufficient to perform and 
are handled correctly to prevent degradation. NASA-STD-5019, Fracture Control 
Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware, establishes the fracture control requirements 
for all Human-Rated spaceflight systems including payloads, propulsion systems, orbital 
support equipment, and planetary habitats.  NASA-STD-6008, NASA Fastener 
Procurement, Receiving Inspection, and Storage Practices for Spaceflight Hardware, 
establishes fastener procurement, receiving inspection, and storage practices for all
fasteners used for spaceflight hardware that are procured, received, tested, inventoried, 
or installed for space flight.  NASA-STD-5001A, Structural Design and Test Factors of 
Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, establishes NASA structural strength design and test 
factors, as well as service life factors to be used for spaceflight hardware development 
and verification. NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment Requirements for
Liquid Fueled Space Propulsion System Engines, provides strength and life assessment 
requirements for liquid fueled space propulsion system engines. NASA-STD-5009, 
Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture-Critical Metallic Components,
establishes the nondestructive evaluation (NDE) requirements for any NASA system or 
component, flight or ground, where fracture control is a requirement.
The Constellation Program provides a list of candidate DFMR items in CxP 70038,
Constellation Program Hazard Analyses Methodology (Reference 3).  The candidate list 
must be applied with caution due to the fact they are candidates only, the rationale for 
acceptance must be provided and approved by the Constellation Safety and 
Engineering Review Panel (CSERP) as well as the Engineering Technical Authority.  
The specific implementation of DFMR must be understood.  One cautionary aspect is 
that the system may have components considered DFMR while other functions are 
failure tolerant.  An example of this is a pressure vessel.  Structurally, the ability to 
contain the fluid at the vessel’s rated pressure is typically DFMR (when not connected 
to a pressurized system).   The control of its internal pressure is controlled by 
redundancy (when connected to a pressurized system).  There is usually a combination 
of multiple relief valves and/or burst disks on a pressurized system to prevent over-
pressurization (See figure 1).  Pressure vessels maintain a Safety Factor when 
considering ultimate strength.  But, additional cycle life should be considered.  The 
technique for determining cycle life and performing initial crack size inspections is also 
standard throughout NASA.  Typically, there is also a Safety Factor of 4 applied to cycle 
life.  There are standard material property values that are allowed and ways to protect 
against standard causes for failure such as specifications for the ability to withstand 
corrosive environments and for handling of composite pressure vessels to prevent 
damage.  The previously mentioned top level NASA documents were used to create a 
Constellation specific structures document, CxP 70135, Constellation Program 
Structural Design and Verification Requirements; which covers these pressure vessel 
containment aspects.
Another example of a DFMR candidate for Constellation is the use of wire for providing 
power.   Typically redundant wires are not run to power a safety critical function.  
Rather, the wire is sized or derated to handle a larger load than would be necessary for 
the worst case draw from the load.  For example, a wire having a nominal current 
requirement of 4 amps would be sized to carry 16 amps and would also maintain a fuse 
rated well above the worst-case anticipated load which would be well below 16 amps. 
This allows for the hardware to continue functioning in the event of a surge or other 
unexpected anomaly without losing the function or heating up the wire. Along with this 
approach, there are materials, testing, and qualification requirements. 
The Space Shuttle Payload Safety Requirements Document (Reference 4) states,
“Payload hazards which are controlled by compliance with specific requirements of this 
document other than failure tolerance are called Design for Minimum Risk areas of 
design.  Examples are structures, pressure vessels, pressurized line and fittings, 
functional pyrotechnic devices, mechanisms in critical applications, material 
compatibility, flammability, etc.  Hazard controls related to these areas are extremely 
critical and warrant careful attention to the details of verification of compliance on the 
part of the payload organization and the NSTS.” NSTS 1700.7B also points to a 
NSTS/ISS 13830, Payload Safety Review and Data Submittal Requirements (Reference 
5), which provides specifics for many DFMR items and provides a list of items required 
for acceptance of structures and pressurized systems such as a fracture control plan 
and verification details.  Many of the documents that are required for structures in this 
list are derived from the same top-level NASA documents stated above.  The payload 
list of acceptable DFMR items is shorter than the Constellation list and the number of 
requirements is greater due to the nature of payloads.  Payloads are typically produced 
by a wide variety of entities, ranging from universities to NASA Centers, therefore the 
requirements must be proscriptive.  The Constellation Program is being designed and 
built by long standing NASA space flight contractors which have well developed 
requirements, plans and procedures.
Summary
A safety panel does not usually accept DFMR easily: redundancy is preferred.  There 
must be sufficient rational for why redundancy cannot be used and specific, well-
understood certification techniques for the item. 
DFMR is not an option or choice it is a state of being, being not able to accomplish 
redundancy.  DFMR is not to be confused with zero Failure Tolerant, which is an option. 
If an item is not redundant and it is not considered DFMR by the safety panel it may be 
considered zero failure tolerant. If an item falls into the zero failure tolerant category it 
may not have a previously well documented and understood approach to insuring its 
adequacy.  There must be waiver/deviation rationale provided to justify reasons why 
redundancy cannot be used and what means are going to be provided that the item will 
be reasonably assumed not to fail. 
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Design Approaches to Safety
• The overall objective is to provide the safest design that can 
accomplish the mission given the constraints imposed on the 
program.  
– Fault Tolerance
– Design For Minimum Risk
HAZARD (RISK) REDUCTION ORDER OF 
PRECEDENCE
1) Eliminate the Hazard
2) Design to Minimize Hazards (Failure Tolerance or DFMR)
3) Incorporate Safety Devices
4) Provide Caution and Warning Devices
5) Develop and Implement Special Procedures
NOTE: Some hazards may require the combination of several of these 
approaches to adequately mitigate a potential hazard.
Failure Tolerance
• Failure tolerance is the primary and preferred approach to 
control hazards. 
– Failure tolerance is an approach to controlling hazards which may include 
addition of redundant systems (similar or dissimilar), error checking, inhibits, 
protections against human error or inadvertent actions, or other methods 
incorporated into the design which preclude the occurrence of the hazard.
– The level of failure tolerance should be commensurate with the severity of 
the hazard and the likelihood of occurrence.
– Does not infer that low quality is acceptable or unlike redundancy is not 
desired.
Failure Tolerance 
• Dissimilar Redundancy
– Matches 
– Lighter
• Susceptibility
– Matches to Moister
– Lighter to no Fuel
• Common cause
– High Winds
– Water
Design for Minimum Risk
• DFMR is an approach to controlling hazards by providing design 
margin in the system to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of a 
hazardous effect. The hazards are controlled through a defined 
process in which approved standards and margins are 
implemented.  Application of margin may be implemented 
through increased dispersion of the environment or system 
properties that respond to the environment.
– DFMR is not an option or choice it is a state of being, which results from not 
being able to accomplish redundancy.  Not simply an alternative to failure 
tolerance because of cost, schedule, or noncompliance with failure 
tolerance 
– More than increased margin, it is an approach that relies on years of proven 
capability.  Relies on robust design, standard approach, and high quality to 
provide the increased likelihood the required function is available.
Zero-Failure-Tolerance
• If an item is not redundant and it is not 
considered DFMR, it is most likely zero-
failure-tolerant.
– The item may not have a previously well 
documented and understood approach to insuring 
its adequacy. 
– There must be waiver/deviation rationale provided 
to justify reasons why redundancy cannot be used 
and what means are going to be provided that the 
item will be reasonably assumed not to fail. 
DFMR or Redundancy?
Thermal Redundancy 
TPS ? 
Nozzles?
DFMR and Redundancy
A
1800 psi
DOT 
B
100 psi
DOT
The pressurization of B is controlled
by Fault Tolerance, there are three
Methods to control the pressure.
Regulator
Two Relief Valves
The structure of B (strength,
fracture toughness) is 
controlled by DFMR
DFMR vs. Redundancy
Single Nozzle - DFMR
Two igniters possible-
redundancy
Two processors commanding
firing - redundancy
Single Grain- DFMR
Single Case-DFMR
Eight Motors, any seven capable of 
performing function (one motor out)-
redundancy.
Rationale for use of DFMR
• Where failure tolerance is not the appropriate approach to control 
hazards, specific measures need to be employed to:
1) Recognize the importance of the hazards being controlled.
2) Ensure robustness of the design.
3) Ensure adequate attention/focus is being applied to the design, manufacture, test, 
analysis, and inspection of the items.
• This takes advantage of existing standards or standards approved by 
the Technical Authorities, to control hazards associated with the 
physical properties of the hardware and are typically controlled via 
application of margin to the environments experienced by the design or 
system properties affected by the environment. 
• Acceptance of these approaches by the Technical Authorities avoids 
processing waivers for numerous hazard causes where failure 
tolerance is not the appropriate approach. 
What is adequate attention/focus?
• Design (in addition to the application of specifically approved standards and specifications ):
– includes identification of specific design features which minimize the probability of occurrence of 
failure modes (e.g., application of stringent factors of safety or other design margins).
• Build
– Includes establishing special process controls and documentation, special handling, and 
highlighting the importance of the item for those involved in the manufacturing process.
• Verify
– Test:
• includes accelerated life testing, fleet leader testing program, testing to understand failure 
modes, or other testing to establish additional confidence and margin in the design.
– Analysis (in lieu of tests)
• includes correlation with testing representative of the actual configuration and the 
collection, management, and analysis of data used in trending failures, verifying loss of 
crew requirements, and evaluating flight anomalies. 
– Inspection
• includes identification of specific inspection criteria to be applied to the item or the 
application of Government Mandatory Inspection Points for important characteristics of the 
item. 
Summary 
• DFMR requires understanding the hazard, known 
controls, and a good system of implementation.
Zero-Failure-Tolerant
-Nominal Standards
DFMR
- Application of 
Margins on top of 
Nominal Standards
The level of effort required 
for acceptability is the 
same.
